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ENABLING TORTS
Robert L. Rabin*
In recent years, critics of tort law have sounded the refrain of a
system "out of control," and have had little difficulty in identifying
illustrative cases to support their claims. To the dismay of some ob-
servers, their worst fears seem to be confirmed once again by the cur-
rent wave of litigation against handgun manufacturers.1 Some see this
litigation as the natural (feared) outgrowth-the predicted domino ef-
fect-of the recently-concluded multistate litigation against the to-
bacco industry.2 Others see it as pure politics, whether tobacco-
related or not: an attempt to accomplish regulatory aims that have
been largely thwarted in the legislative forum through the judicial sys-
tem.3 Whatever the motivation, the twin notion of gun manufacturer
responsibility for conscious oversupply of a market and negligent dis-
tributional practices is attacked as simply the most recent instance of a
tort system cut loose from any discernible linkage to sensible
foundations.4
But one person's meat is another's poison, as they say. Supporters
of the gun litigation would argue that acceptance of these theories
would constitute just the latest instance of judicial creativity in tort
* A. Calder Mackay Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. Thanks to my colleague Marc
Franklin for his helpful comments, and to Kirstin Ault, Stanford Law School, Class of 1999, for
her research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). See also Merrill v.
Navegar, Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146 (1999) (reversing summary judgment in favor of defendant
gun manufacturer-an assault weapon rather than a handgun manufacturer-and reinstating the
claims of survivors and representatives of the victims of a shooting rampage by a disgruntled ex-
employee of a San Francisco law firm that resulted in eight deaths and six serious injuries); Tom
Hays, Gun Verdict May Boost Companion Law Suits; Negligence Finding Sets New Standard,
WASH. PosT, Feb. 13, 1999, at A12. These suits have been filed by municipalities seeking cost
recovery and marketing restrictions, as well as individuals for personal injury. See Paul M. Bar-
rett, Talks to Settle Gun Lawsuits Produce Little, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 1999, at B15.
2. See Paul M. Barrett, Jumping the Gun? Attacks on Firearms Echo Earlier Assaults On To-
bacco Industry, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 1999, at Al.
3. See Fox Butterfield, Results in Tobacco Litigation Spur Cities to File Gun Suits, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 24, 1998, at Al; John Herzfeld, Jury in Brooklyn Finds Gun Makers Negligent, Awards
$520,000 in Damages to One Victim, 27 BNA PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. 170, 171 (1999).
4. See Jodi Wilgoren, Three Council Members Call for Lawsuit Against Gun Makers, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 18, 1998, at B7.
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law.5 One version of this counter-argument would insist that it is a
proper function of tort law to assign responsibility and create appro-
priate incentives for safety when there is protracted legislative inac-
tion in response to a continuing serious personal injury toll.6 Another,
more traditionally lawyer-like, response would be that in fact there is
adequate precedent to support this latest effort to force an industry-
through the medium of tort liability-to live up to its social responsi-
bilities.7 These counter-arguments are not self-contradictory, of
course, but they do rest on very different assumptions regarding how
proactive the judiciary should be in the torts arena.
Rather than focusing narrowly on the handgun litigation, my pur-
pose in this essay is to examine the structure of the claim for redress in
a broader tort context-a context that I will refer to as "enabling
torts." But first consider the factual pattern common to the handgun
cases. Hamilton v. Accu-Tek,8 a widely-discussed recent case, in which
a jury for the first time awarded damages against handgun manufac-
turers on a collective liability theory, involved actions by seven shoot-
ing victims who were injured by illegally obtained weapons.9 The
plaintiffs, only one of whom was actually awarded damages, sued
twenty-five gun manufacturers for negligent marketing.10 The plain-
tiffs' principal argument was that gun manufacturers over-supply
states with weak gun laws and that guns sold in those states subse-
quently make their way to states with stricter gun laws through an
underground market." In fact, post-trial interviews with jurors re-
vealed that they did not find this theory persuasive; instead, they
based liability primarily on the failure of certain of the gun manufac-
turers to supervise the marketing practices of distributors and retailers
(especially uncontrolled sales at gun shows).' 2 Both theories, how-
ever, seem to share a common set of assumptions: guns are extremely
hazardous when in the hands of criminal types, and industry market-
5. See David Kairys, Legal Claims of Cities Against the Manufacturers of Handguns, 71 TEMP.
L. REV. 1 (1998).
6. See generally Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219 (N.J. 1984) (finding social host liability for
serving liquor to intoxicant).
7. See Kairys, supra note 5, at 12-16.




12. See Vanessa O'Connell, Open Season: How a Jury Placed the Firearms Industry on the
Legal Defensive, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 1999, at Al.
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ing practices that facilitate this circumstance are a sufficient basis for
assigning responsibility to the industry.13
In my view, there is an underlying premise here that has been inad-
equately explored. It is best captured, perhaps, by the notion of an
enabling tort. And it comes to full flowering in our risk-saturated
closing decades of the twentieth century-an epoch in which our per-
ceptions of hazards in the neighborhood, workplace, and environment
have reached unprecedented heights. In this milieu, blameworthiness
is not so readily confined as was the case in times past.14 Beyond the
immediate perpetrator of harm, the victim perceives the individual, or
13. See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (Weinstein, J.). In his opinion supporting the jury ver-
dict, Judge Weinstein framed the duty question as follows: "It is the duty of manufacturers of a
uniquely hazardous product, designed to kill and wound human beings, to take reasonable steps
available at the point of their sale to primary distributors to reduce the possibility that these
instruments will fall into the hands of those likely to misuse them." Id. at 825. In Merrill, involv-
ing the claim against the assault weapon manufacturer, the court adverted to the duty to manu-
facture and market a product using "due care not to increase the risk beyond that inherent in the
presence of firearms in our society." Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146, 163 (1999).
Another theoretical base for recovery in gun cases is products liability. But it is awkward to
use either design defect or failure to warn as a basis for responsibility for criminal intervention,
as contrasted to injury situations where "innocent" misuse-for example misfiring in child's
play-might well have been avoided by a better design or warning. Nonetheless, some of the
municipal suits have included a product defect claim, asserting "personalization devices" could
be incorporated into weapons precluding their use by unsanctioned third-parties. See Vanessa
O'Connell, Cleveland Becomes Sixth Municipality to Sue Group of Gun Manufacturers, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 9, 1999, at B3. Products liability theories are outside the scope of this essay.
14. Showing considerable prescience, Oliver Wendell Holmes raised this question in his classic
article Privilege, Malice and Intent: "Why is not a man who sells fire-arms answerable for as-
saults committed with pistols bought of him, since he must be taken to know the probability that,
sooner or later, someone will buy a pistol of him for some unlawful end?" Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REv. 1, 10 (1894). As might be expected,
however, Holmes was skeptical-and, in fact, concluded that there should be no liability: "The
principle seems to be pretty well established, in this country at least, that every one has a right to
rely upon his fellow-men acting lawfully, and, therefore, is not answerable for himself acting
upon the assumption that they will do so, however improbable it may be." Id.
Holmes' assumption that others will act lawfully would, of course, virtually eliminate enabling
liability-that is, liability for risk-generating behavior leading to harms caused by third-party
intervening conduct. But Holmes was not quite willing to bar the door entirely; instead he ad-
dressed exceptions to his no-liability principle:
[The initial actor] is liable, if having authority he commands it; he may be liable if he
induces it by persuasion. I do not see that it matters how he knowingly gives the other
a motive for unlawful action, whether by fear, fraud, or persuasion, if the motive works.
But, in order to take away the protection of his right to rely upon lawful conduct, you
must show that he intended to bring about consequences to which that unlawful act was
necessary. Ordinarily, this is the same as saying that he must have intended the unlaw-
ful act.
Id. at 11. As the text that follows will develop, Holmes' narrow exception, creating liability for
third-party intervenor harm only in essence when intended by the initial actor, is a far more
restrictive path than tort law has followed.
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more often, the enterprise, that set the stage for the suffering that un-
folded. The Enabler.
In the sections that follow, I will identify some early manifestations
of the enabling concept, discuss its recent extensions, and assess its
"fit" with the principal goals of tort law.
I. NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT AND BEYOND
A paradigm case of negligent entrustment involves the car owner
who allows an unlicensed or perhaps intoxicated individual to drive
his car, and as a consequence, an innocent plaintiff, a pedestrian for
example, is injured. Despite the intervening misconduct of the errant
driver, the courts have had no difficulty in holding the car owner re-
sponsible.15 Indeed, the principle was given the imprimatur of ac-
cepted doctrine in the Restatement of Torts seventy years ago, 16 and is
found in slightly different language in Restatement Second, Section
390, which states:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for the
use of another whom the supplier knows or has reason to know to
be likely because of his youth, inexperience, or otherwise, to use it
in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself
and others whom the supplier should expect to share in or be en-
dangered by its use, is subject to liability for physical harm resulting
to them.17
In reality, the foundational premise of liability here is broader than
the plain language of the negligent entrustment doctrine would sug-
gest. Consider the facts of a much-discussed case of more recent vin-
tage, expanding the notion of entrustment considerably beyond a
literal reading of the Restatement Second.'8 Defendant provided the
funds for her grand-nephew Wilson to purchase an automobile, which
15. See, e.g., Pierce v. Standow, 163 Cal. App. 2d 286 (1st Dist. 1958) (entrustment by parent
to unlicensed minor child); Schneider v. Midtown Motor Co., 854 P.2d 1322 (Colo. Ct. App.
1992) (automobile dealer sale to unlicensed driver); Alexander v. Alterman Transp. Lines Inc.,
387 So. 2d 422 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (entrustment by employer to intoxicated employee);
Vilas v. Steavenson, 496 N.W.2d 543 (Neb. 1993) (entrustment by employer to unlicensed em-
ployee); Lombardo v. Hoaq, 566 A.2d 1185 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1989) (entrustment to intoxicated
friend); V.L. Nicholson Constr. Co. v. Lane, 150 S.W.2d 1069 (Tenn. 1941) (entrustment by em-
ployer to employee known to be habitual drunkard). See also Karen L. Ellmore, Annotation,
Negligent Entrustment of Motor Vehicle to Unlicensed Driver, 55 A.L.R. 4th 1100 (1997).
16. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 390 (1934). Section 390 is identical in the First and
Second Restatements with only the following changes: (1) "in the vicinity of its use" in the First
Restatement is replaced by the term "endangered by its use" in the Second Restatement, (2)
"from facts known to him should know" in the First is replaced by "had reason to know" in the
Second.
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 (1965).
18. Vince v. Wilson, 561 A.2d 103 (Vt. 1989).
[Vol. 49:435
ENABLING TORTS
he then proceeded to drive in a sufficiently reckless manner to seri-
ously injure the plaintiff.' 9 Strictly speaking, defendant "entrusted"
nothing to her young relation; indeed, she mentioned his dubious driv-
ing credentials to the co-defendant car dealer.20 But she did supply
the money that put Wilson behind the wheel, and this could have been
taken as tantamount to inviting disaster: Wilson had flunked the
driver's test on numerous occasions (and never passed it), and, to
make matters worse, was an alcoholic and a drug abuser.21
It would have been a wooden application of the entrustment doc-
trine that limited liability to "supplying a chattel" situations, with
overtones of ownership and control, and the court acknowledges as
much.22 The key factor counseling liability, implicit in the opinion, is
that defendant paved the way for a truly reckless individual to be im-
posing serious risks of injury on the public at large. 23 This, of course,
is the essence of the negligent entrustment doctrine. But my point is
that the doctrine itself is best viewed as one of a subset of situations
that more generically involve enabling behavior that under other cir-
cumstances-in this instance, assisting a needy relative to get hold of a
car-would seem a perfectly innocent, indeed a commendable act.
Once viewed through this wider lens of risk facilitation, a cluster of
superficially unrelated older cases come into focus as bearing a dis-
tinct family resemblance. Three examples will suffice. In the leading
case of Hines v. Garrett,2 4 a young woman was taken beyond her train
stop through the careless conduct of the motorman, and, as a conse-
quence, had to walk back at night through a dangerous area known as
Hoboes' Hollow.25 She was raped twice, and subsequently brought an
action against the carrier for its driver's negligence.26 The case is a
classic instance of enabling harm brought to fruition by a malevolent
third party, and the court saw it in just those terms.
We do not wish to be understood as questioning the general propo-
sition that no responsibility for a wrong attaches whenever an in-
dependent act of a third person intervenes between the negligence
complained of and the injury. But . . . this proposition does not
apply where the very negligence alleged consists of exposing the in-
jured party to the act causing the injury.27
19. Id. at 106.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 105.
23. Id. at 106.
24. Hines v. Garrett, 108 S.E. 690 (Va. 1921).
25. Id. at 691.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 695 (citation omitted).
1999]
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Nothing turns on the fact that here the predators were wholly un-
known to the defendant-unlike Vince v. Wilson28 and the paradigm
negligent entrustment cases where friends and/or relatives turn out to
be risky characters. It would be recognizing a limitation without sub-
stance, a resurrection of the "control" notion, to distinguish between
paving the way for harm by heedlessness to identifiably dangerous
persons in contrast to careless non-recognition of dangerous places.
A second, more generic example-the so-called "key in the ignition
cases" 29 -sharpens the risk enhancement dimension of this cluster of
scenarios. Defendant negligently leaves the key to his/her unlocked
car in the ignition; the car is stolen by a third party; the thief's careless
driving injures the plaintiff; and the defendant is sued by the plaintiff.
Some state courts base recovery on a statutory proviso; and, interest-
ingly, some of the state courts that deny statutory recovery do so on
the basis of legislative intent-more specifically, a perceived intent to
reduce auto theft rather than to promote safety.30 Of still greater sali-
ence, some states that afford common law recovery, recognize a duty
to the victim only under "special circumstances." '31 As spelled out by
the California Supreme Court, in a case where a truck had been left
overnight in a highly dangerous neighborhood with the key in the igni-
tion, those circumstances included
the area in which the truck had been parked-one frequented by
persons who had little respect for the rights of others, and popu-
lated by alcoholics; the intent that the truck remain in the location
for a relatively long period of time-overnight; the size of the vehi-
cle-rendering it capable of inflicting more serious injury or damage
if not properly controlled; and the fact that safe operation of a half-
loaded two-ton truck was not a matter of common experience.32
28. Vince v. Wilson, 561 A.2d 103, 104 (Vt. 1989).
29. See, e.g., Cruz v. Middlekauf Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 909 P.2d 1252 (Utah 1996), in which
defendant car dealer left the keys in the ignitions of cars on its auto sales lot. A thief stole one of
the cars and ran into the plaintiffs while trying to evade pursuing police. The three opinions in
the case, in which plaintiffs stated a good claim for relief, survey the approaches taken in these
scenarios.
30. Cornelius J. Peck, An Exercise Based Upon Empirical Data: Liability for Harm Caused by
Stolen Autos, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 909, 911.
31. See, e.g., Hergenrether v. East, 393 P.2d 164 (Cal. 1964) (reinstating plaintiffs verdict
when key left in ignition of truck for extended period of time in "Skid-row" neighborhood);
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Grain Belt Breweries, Inc., 245 N.W.2d 186 (Minn. 1976)
(finding liability for key left in ignition of beer truck in area of bars and liquor stores known for
"proportionately" higher incidents of heavy drinking); Guaspari v. Gorsky, 36 A.D.2d 225 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1971) (finding liability for key left in ignition next to "fire barn" where VFW field day
event was taking place).
32. Palma v. U.S. Indus. Fasteners, 681 P.2d 893, 902 (Cal. 1984).
[Vol. 49:435
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Note that it might similarly be regarded as unreasonable to leave
the keys in the ignition in a respectable upper-middle class neighbor-
hood; after all, the temptation to "joy-ride" is not limited to those
whom the courts regard as degenerate types. And in all cases, the
costs of vigilance could be taken to be minimal. Yet the court's refer-
ence to a "special circumstances requirement" clearly suggests a dif-
ferent outcome in the absence of heightened risk. What is at play
here? Under the guise of a traditional doctrinal formulation, "no
proximate cause," the courts adhere to a straightforward principle of
fairness, call it a disproportionality principle. In this regard, when the
misconduct of the intervenor-in this instance, the thief behind the
wheel-seems considerably more antisocial than that of the initiator,
the common law courts have been committed to the proposition that
only the egregious immediate wrongdoer should be considered legally
responsible. 33 By contrast, an open invitation to reckless types is
viewed as another matter.
Increasingly, this proximate cause limitation, reflecting a compart-
mentalized view of individual responsibility, has been undermined.
Consider, in this regard, another generic "enabling" scenario: dram
shop and social host liability for alcohol-related auto injuries. 34 At
common law, no liability was recognized beyond that of the intoxi-
cated person; drinking oneself into a hazard-creating stupor was sim-
ply regarded as independently more outrageous behavior than
furnishing liquor to the inebriate. In more recent times, however, the
purveyor's responsibility has been recognized as well, both in the en-
actment of dram shop legislation, and, with less than a consensus,
through common law tort responsibility.35 In an important sense, the
erosion of the proximate cause limitation for intervening acts can be
regarded as a temporal shift in moral sensibilities from a more individ-
ualistic era to one in which tort law (and, on occasion, statutorily-
33. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 181 N.E.2d 430 (N.Y. 1962) (offering
a perhaps overzealous application of the principle, when a firefighter neglected to mention the
need for insulating material on defendant's heating block to a nurse who applied the block to the
plaintiff's body; firefighter was held to break the chain of causation to manufacturer). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435(2) (1965).
34. See Clendening v. Shipton, 149 Cal. App. 3d 191 (4th Dist. 1983); Whelchel v. Laing
Properties, Inc., 378 S.E.2d 478 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989); McGuiggan v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co.,
496 N.E.2d 141 (Mass. 1986); see also Edward L. Raymond, Annotation, Social Host's Liability
for Injuries Incurred by Third Parties as a Result of Intoxicated Guest's Negligence, 62 A.L.R. 4th
16 (1988).
35. For a particularly strong articulation of the judicial role in responding to inadequate legis-
lative responsiveness to this serious social problem, see Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219 (N.J.
1984) (subsequently overturned by legislative reaction). See also Sharon E. Conaway, Com-
ment, The Continuing Search for Solutions to the Drinking Driver Tragedy and the Problem of
Social Host Liability, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 403 (1988).
1999]
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based civil claims) increasingly reflects more expansive notions of re-
sponsibility for the conduct of others.
But the communitarian impulses can be overstated. "Enabling" has
a proactive connotation, in my view, that distinguishes this type of
responsibility from failures generally to intervene on behalf of an en-
dangered person. Consider, for example the law professor's classic
hypothetical of the coldly indifferent onlooker to the plight of a baby
on the railroad tracks, a train bearing down on the infant. These latter
cases have traditionally been treated as no-duty situations, grounded
in a time-honored distinction between instances of misfeasance and
nonfeasance-except when a "special relationship" exists.36 A varia-
tion on this failure-to-assist scenario is the famous case of Tarasoff v.
Regents of the University of California,37 in which a therapist was held
to have owed a duty to warn a victim of his patient's violence-vio-
lence based on intentions that had been revealed to the therapist.38
But here, too, liability turned on a special relationship-in this in-
stance, between the therapist and his patient-rather than overtly
risk-enhancing conduct by the defendant.
By contrast, in the enabling situations that I have been discussing,
defendant has affirmatively enhanced the risk of harm, and as a conse-
quence, no special relationship is required to establish responsibility.
Reconsider, in this regard, the key-in-the-ignition cases, where all of
the parties are clearly strangers to each other. Indeed, in Vince v. Wil-
son,39 if the defendant had been a stranger who financed the ne'er-do-
well's purchase of the car, rather than his grand-aunt, the case for lia-
bility would have been at least as strong if not stronger. 40
36. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965).
37. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
38. Id. at 353.
39. 561 A.2d 103 (Vt. 1989).
40. At the same time, consider the continuing limiting power of the misfeasance-nonfeasance
theme. Whatever the relationship between Wilson and the defendant, if the defendant's involve-
ment had been not the financing of the purchase but a failure to respond to the dealer's question
regarding whether Wilson was sufficiently responsible to warrant selling him a car, it seems virtu-
ally certain that defendant's "failure to get involved" would have insulated her from liability. Id.
at 105. Consider, in this regard, the interesting recent California Supreme Court decision in
Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997). Plaintiff brought a negli-
gent misrepresentation claim against a number of school districts, which had given unreservedly
affirmative recommendations for a school administrator, concealing information they had of his
past sexual misconduct. Id. at 584. In effect, the claim was that these school districts put the
students at risk in the school where the administrator was eventually hired. Subsequently, he
sexually abused the plaintiff. Id. at 585. The court recognized an affirmative obligation to dis-
close, but also cautioned that
[t]he parties cite no case or Restatement provision suggesting that a former employer
has an affirmative duty of disclosure that would preclude such a "no comment" letter.
As we have previously indicated, liability may not be imposed for mere nondisclosure
[Vol. 49:435
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These scattered situations, in which a seemingly isolated careless act
enhances the risk that a malevolent or consciously indifferent inter-
venor will seriously injure an innocent third party, create the back-
drop against which enabling behavior of a more entrepreneurial kind
comes under judicial scrutiny in our contemporary setting of a risk-
sensitized society. The courts have responded by creatively extending,
or at least taking seriously the prospect of, liability in contexts where
earlier common law courts would most likely have been dismissive on
"no-duty" grounds. Such are the creatively expansionist tendencies-
maddening to some critics-of the tort system.41
II. NEWER DEPARTURES: ENTREPRENEURIAL LIABILITY THEMES
A. Not-So-Random Neighborhood Violence
Times had apparently gotten hard for the owners of 1500 Massachu-
setts Avenue, a large apartment complex in the vicinity of DuPont
Circle in Washington, D.C. As the court describes the situation in
or other failure to act, at least in the absence of some special relationship not alleged
here.
Id. at 589. Whatever incentives this limitation might create to simply remain silent across-the-
board in fielding requests for letters of reference, the court clearly felt that responsibility was
warranted where the defendants explicitly created a false sense of security.
41. In addition to the developments discussed below, there are some singular instances of
enabling conduct in the broadcast and print media areas. An especially striking example from
the book publishing sphere is Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., in which defendant published two
detailed instruction manuals on various methods for killing a victim and covering up the crime.
128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997). A third party faithfully followed the instructions and killed three
people, whose survivors brought suit against the publisher. Id. at 239. Most of the opinion
overturning the trial court's entry of summary judgment is devoted to First Amendment consid-
erations that are outside the scope of this essay. But the underlying tort claim bears a strong
family connection to the enabling cases I have been discussing-grounded as it is in provision of
information to a malevolent third party that made possible his injuring innocent victims. A
singular example from the broadcast area is Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., in which a radio
station conducted a contest in which the first listener to reach a disk jockey travelling on the
freeway would win a prize. 539 P.2d 36, 38 (Cal. 1975). The disk jockey's whereabouts were
indicated through periodic broadcast of clues. In their efforts to win the prize, two teenage
drivers in separate vehicles engaged in a high speed pursuit, killing the driver of another vehicle
which was forced off the highway. The California Supreme Court unanimously affirmed a plain-
tiff's judgment. Id. at 42. The more typical media factual pattern involves a TV program featur-
ing graphic violence that the plaintiff in effect characterizes as a defectively dangerous
product-one that incites a third party to violent conduct leading to the plaintiff's injury. Obvi-
ously, the causation element in these cases is highly debatable, and there are also, once again,
serious First Amendment issues. See, e.g., Olivia N. v. NBC, 126 Cal. App. 3d 488 (1981) (involv-
ing a claim against defendant broadcaster alleging that the boys responsible for sexually assault-
ing plaintiff had been incited to do so by a particularly vivid rape scene in a program aired by
defendant). Arguably, this scenario is somewhat different from enabling behavior; it is more in
the nature of inciting misconduct than enabling it. But this could be regarded as a distinction
without a difference.
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Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp.,42 when the
plaintiff moved into the building in 1959, there was a doorman on duty
twenty-four hours a day, an employee at a desk in the lobby, two at-
tendants at the parking garage, and a policy of locking the side en-
trance to the building every evening. 43 Contrast the situation, as the
court describes it, seven years later when the plaintiff was assaulted
and robbed one evening in an interior corridor, just outside her
apartment.
By mid-1966, however, the main entrance had no doorman, the desk
in the lobby was left unattended much of the time, the 15th Street
entrance was generally unguarded due to a decrease in garage per-
sonnel, and the 16th Street entrance was often left unlocked at
night. The entrances were allowed to be thus unguarded in the face
of an increasing number of assaults, larcenies, and robberies being
perpetrated against the tenants in and from the common hallways of
the apartment building.44
A depressingly familiar sounding tale of American urban violence
that became common currency in the 1960s (and thereafter). What is
distinctive about the case itself, however, is that it became the leading
precedent for recognition of a duty on the part of residential apart-
ment owners to exercise reasonable care to protect their tenants from
third-party violence. Interestingly, in the course of the opinion, the
court draws on the key-in-the-ignition cases, among others, to support
the notion that the defendant in effect had created an environment
inviting criminal activity by eliminating the precautionary measures it
had taken at the time that the plaintiff initially rented the apartment.45
But the main thrust of the opinion is to emphasize a deterrence
rationale for creating a duty to protect against third-party violence.46
Not only is the renter in a better position than the tenant to adopt
precautionary measures, but the renter is better situated than the po-
lice to diminish the risk of criminal assault on the premises-the po-
lice, after all, cannot be expected to patrol the interiors of large
residential apartment buildings and to exercise vigilance in private
spaces. But implicitly, of course, the main "deterrence gap" is the in-
ability to effectively reach the putative wrongdoer himself, either
through criminal or tort sanctions. This is the crux of the matter and
the link to creating responsibility for enabling behavior.
42. 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
43. Id. at 479.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 484.
46. Id. at 485-88.
[Vol. 49:435
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It is similarly the link to a proactive judicial approach in later exten-
sions of the duty to protect against third-party harm in other commer-
cial property settings. Selectively, the courts have seriously consid-
ered the prospect of protective duties in contexts ranging from
shopping centers to parking facilities and university campuses.47 The
recent California experience is revealing, both of the expansive ten-
dencies and its likely limits.
In Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center,48 the court tried to put
to rest an issue that has plagued courts around the country in these
cases: whether "prior incidents" are a prerequisite to establishing a
duty of precautionary conduct.49 Once again, there is an interesting
parallel here to the key-in-the-ignition cases. "Prior incidents" can be
seen as roughly analogous to the "special circumstances" require-
ment-leaving the car unsecured in a dangerous neighborhood, and
so forth-that in California at least is a prerequisite to liability. The
notion here is that responsibility is contextual: what might constitute
inviting dangerous conduct in one milieu is not necessarily so in an-
other. Correspondingly, what might be regarded as a particularly in-
viting commercial space to predatory types is similarly contextual;
recall the emphasis in Kline on the private, secluded areas in a large
apartment complex.5 0
Ann M. picks up on this point. Although the California court re-
futes an earlier case that had suggested in dictum that prior incidents
were of little consequence, it then goes on to discuss the setting with
greater particularity.51 The case itself had involved a criminal assault
in a shopping mall. Suggestively, the court remarked on plaintiff's
failure "to show that, like a parking garage or an all-night convenience
store, a retail store located in a shopping center creates 'an especial
temptation and opportunity for criminal misconduct.' ' 52 As such, it
was unnecessary to determine whether "some types of commercial
property are so inherently dangerous that, even in the absence of
prior similar incidents, providing security guards will fall within the
scope of a landowner's duty of due care."'53
47. See Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist., 36 Cal. 3d 799 (1984) (community
college); Abner v. Oakland Mall Ltd., 531 N.W.2d 726 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (shopping center);
Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 445 A.2d 1141 (N.J. 1982) (parking lot); Miller v. State of New
York, 467 N.E.2d 493 (N.Y. 1984) (college dormitory).
48. 863 P.2d 207 (Cal. 1993).
49. Id. at 215.
50. Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
51. Ann. M., 863 P.2d at 214.




The California Supreme Court's speculative comment did not go
unheeded for long. In Sharon P. v. Arman, Ltd.,54 a state court of
appeals, highlighted the "especial temptation" language, and dis-
cussed in detail the "unique nature of a parking complex [in which
plaintiff had been sexually assaulted], which invites acts of theft and
vandalism. '55 The court then held the proprietor to a duty of due care,
despite no prior similar incidents on the premises.5 6
In the premises cases, then, we find a selective extension of the en-
abling concept to what might be characterized as ordinary en-
trepreneurial activity. The older entrustment notion, even in its
broader applications, turned on the aberrational character of the risk-
initiator's conduct. Car owners do not routinely lend their vehicles to
drug addicts or leave their keys in the ignition in dangerous neighbor-
hoods, just as train operators are not in the business of mistakenly
letting off passengers in highly dangerous vicinities. By contrast, the
premises-violence cases, as a category, involve commercial activity
systematically conducted in circumstances that heighten third-party
risks of serious injury to others. Having ventured down this road of
intrinsic entrepreneurial risk-enhancement, the courts have, as we
shall see, found themselves in hitherto unexplored territory.
B. Hazards in the Workplace
The dramatic upsurge in products liability litigation that has taken
place since the mid-1960s provides still another variant on the theme
of enabling responsibility. The typical scenario is that the defendant
manufactures factory machinery that has a safety guard to protect an
employee of the factory owner from having a hand mangled by be-
coming enmeshed in the machinery. The factory owner/employer
removes the safety guard to speed up the production process, and the
worker suffers the "foreseeable" injury. I put "foreseeable" in quotes,
because it often serves as the battleground in this version of the third-
party intervenor story.57 A minority view is that foreseeability of al-
teration is irrelevant: since the product was designed and distributed
54. 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 640 (1997).
55. See Louise Lee, Lots of Trouble: Courts Begin to Award Damages to Victims of Parking-
Area Crime, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 1997, at Al.
56. Id. Just prior to publication of this essay, the California Supreme Court reversed and
entered summary judgment for defendant, Sharon P. v. Arman Ltd., 1999 Cal. LEXIS 8163. In
doing so, however, the court adhered to the view that a commercial land occupier's duty ex-
tended not only to cases of "prior similar instances," but to situations involving "other indica-
tions of a reasonably foreseeable risk of violent criminal assaults in that location ..... Id. at *38.
57. Compare Jones v. Ryobi, Ltd., 37 F.3d 423 (8th Cir. 1994), with Piper v. Bear Med. Sys.,
Inc., 883 P.2d 407 (Ariz. App. 1993).
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with a safety guard, that is the end of the matter.58 Harking back to
more compartmentalized notions of individual responsibility (see for
example, the earlier discussion of pre-dram shop comparative fault of
intoxicated party and server), these courts hold that the employer's
fault is the "proximate cause" of the injury.
The problem, of course, is that the employer is shielded from tort
responsibility, and arguably, as a consequence, meaningful safety in-
centives, by the workers' compensation laws. For this reason, the
pragmatic attraction of enabler's liability-the ability to target a real-
istic candidate for deterrence pressure, rather than the more egregious
but tort-proof employer-is a salient feature of the workplace injury
scenario, just as it is in the array of third-party intervenor situations
discussed earlier.
Most courts take the more pragmatic view in these workplace injury
situations, and reject a single-minded focus on the most immediate
wrongdoer. 59 As indicated, the touchstone is "foreseeability;" that is,
the manufacturer's reasonable anticipation that the product will be
altered by removal of the safety guard in the quest for greater
profitability.
An interesting variant, underscoring the enabling theme, is the
course steered by the New York Court of Appeals. In Robinson v.
Reed-Prentice Division,60 the court first addressed the alteration sce-
nario in a case in which the machinery had been designed with a com-
plicated interlock system so that the safety shield could not be
removed by the employer. 61 The employer responded by cutting
holes in the safety shield so that the machinery could operate without
its protections. In the face of this intervening conduct, when the man-
ufacturer of the machinery was sued for subsequent injuries, the court
held that substantial modifications after sale insulated the manufac-
turer from design defect liability.62 The court appeared to take a hard
line, rejecting a foreseeability-based approach: "[m]aterial alterations
at the hands of a third party which work a substantial change in the
condition in which the product was sold by destroying the functional
utility of a key safety feature, however foreseeable that modification
may have been, are not within the ambit of the manufacturer's
responsibility. ,63
58. Jones, 37 F.3d at 423.
59. Piper, 883 P.2d at 407.
60. 403 N.E.2d 440 (N.Y. 1980).
61. Id. at 441.




Nonetheless, six years later, in Lopez v. Precision Papers, Inc.,64 the
court qualified its earlier approach. Plaintiff's employer had removed
the overhead guard on a forklift to ease entry into low spaces for load-
ing and unloading merchandise; the employee was rendered a
quadriplegic by being struck in the head by a large paper roll falling
off a wooden pallet.65 In a terse, two paragraph memorandum opin-
ion, affirming the appellate division's denial of defendant's motion for
summary judgment, the court of appeals concluded "[t]here is evi-
dence in this record that the forklift was purposefully manufactured to
permit its use without the safety guard."'66 Even more sharply than a
foreseeability approach, this condemnation of "purposeful manufac-
ture" that encourages indifference to safety underscores the enabling
theme that I have been developing.67
C. Toxics in the Environment
When the United States Supreme Court decided Cipollone v. Lig-
gett Group, Inc.68 in 1992, bringing down the curtain on the second
wave of tobacco litigation, the invulnerability of the tobacco industry
appeared to have reached new heights. Its unbroken string of court-
room successes spanned four decades. 69 The assumed risk defense-
that plaintiffs freely choose to smoke despite knowledge of the health
hazards-seemed a near-insurmountable obstacle to attacks on the in-
dustry through tort litigation. And now the court had preempted neg-
ligent failure to warn claims for industry conduct after the 1965
enactment of the cigarette labeling act.
But then the unexpected occurred; rarely has the prospect for suc-
cess in the tort system experienced an about-face so rapidly. Begin-
ning less than two years later with the filing of state health cost
reimbursement suits and class action tort claims, the industry was set
on its heels-eventually settling with all fifty of the states, and con-
fronting seemingly endless filings of individual tort suits.70
64. 492 N.E.2d 1214 (N.Y. 1986).
65. Id. at 1215.
66. Id.
67. Recently, the court has extended third-party manufacturer responsibility still further by
holding that a manufacturer may have a duty to warn of foreseeable risks of harm even when
design defect liability under Robinson would be precluded. See Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 700
N.E.2d 303, 308 (N.Y. 1998).
68. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
69. See Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L.
REv. 853, 874-75 (1992).
70. For discussion of the strategies relied on in developing the state reimbursement and tort
class action litigation, through the 1998 effort to secure federal legislation, see PETER PRINGLE,
CORNERED: BIG TOBACCO AT THE BAR OF JUSTICE (1998) (up to the settlement); Robert L.
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The state tobacco-related health cost reimbursement suits, in partic-
ular, have been promoted as the model for the current municipal cost-
recovery suits against handgun manufacturers. 71 Although the to-
bacco cases undoubtedly have played an inspirational role in launch-
ing the municipal handgun suits, the similarities are in fact
superficial-based primarily on the shared objective of governmental
cost recovery.72
The distinctions are critical, and rest on the enabling theme that I
have been developing. As indicated at the outset (and discussed fur-
ther below), the claims of negligent industry practices in marketing of
handguns are a direct descendant of the family of enabling torts: the
central thrust of the argument being that oversupply and/or irrespon-
sible promotion puts a potentially dangerous product in the hands of
criminal actors with malevolent intentions, ultimately leading to the
injury of innocent victims. By contrast, the tobacco health care reim-
bursement suits, as well as the smokers' individual and class action
suits, are premised on claims of direct harm experienced by the imme-
diate users of the product. In fact, this is precisely the difficulty that
plaintiffs have traditionally faced in winning these cases-their lack of
"innocent victim" status. The state reimbursement suits only sur-
mount this barrier by successfully contesting the subrogation-like na-
ture of the claims.73 Even so, the suits are based on the harmful
nature of the industry's product to consumers, rather than an allega-
tion of setting the stage for third-party wrongdoing.
But a more precise analogue to the handgun litigation can be identi-
fied by a closer look at the progeny of the traditional tobacco suits; in
particular, the less-noticed environmental, or secondhand smoke liti-
gation. Indeed, with far less publicity than the smokers' class action
law suits, a Florida state court class action on behalf of flight attend-
ants who claimed to be suffering from a variety of occupationally-
based secondhand smoke-induced harms, Broin v. Philip Morris Cos.,
was filed in 1991. 74 The case was heatedly contested for six years, as
scientific studies of the impact of secondhand smoke proliferated,
Rabin, The Uncertain Future of Tobacco Tort Litigation in the United States, 7 TORT L. REv. 91
(1999) (discussing recent tobacco tort litigation developments).
71. See David E. Rosenbaum, Echoes of Tobacco Battles in Gun Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21,
1999, at 18.
72. And fueled, in each instance, by frustration at the dilatory pace of legislative regulatory
action.
73. And also by adding theories like violation of consumer protection statutes, etc.-"direct"
wrongs to the public.
74. 641 So. 2d 888 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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before settling in 1997 for $300 million in the midst of a global (even-
tually failed) tobacco settlement debate in Congress.75
The controversial Broin settlement set up a research fund, but pro-
vided for no compensation to the flight attendants themselves. In-
stead, the attendants were given the opportunity to pursue individual
litigation, sans recourse to punitive damages, with the industry agree-
ing, in turn, to assume the burden of proof on whether secondhand
smoke exposure can be linked to disease.76 Thus, the claims of deceit
and misinformation on the part of the industry in concealing the risks
of harm associated with exposure to secondhand smoke-rather than
just to smoking itself-are meant to serve as a template for case-by-
case airline attendants' claims. From the enabling perspective, it fol-
lows that this template can serve as a model for other occupational
groups and individuals systematically exposed to secondhand smoke,
as well. If there is a substantial barrier to success in the environmen-
tal tobacco smoke context, it is in establishing causation. 77
In the secondhand smoke context, of course, it could be argued that
the intervening third parties-either the smokers themselves or the
premises operators (bars, restaurants, airlines, etc.)-are neither in-
tentional nor negligent wrongdoers. Although this is a debatable
proposition as far as intervening negligence is concerned, it should not
matter. In this setting, the essential element in enabler responsibility
is that a dangerous "instrumentality" has been put in the hands of a
third-party with a foreseeable expectation that a "remote" victim will
suffer harm. This is the generating force that has given the enabling
concept much of its cross-contextual vitality.78
III. ENTREPRENEURIAL LIABILITY WITH
COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY?
Although the dangerous premises cases and the third-party defec-
tive product suits resonate with emerging late-century notions of re-
75. Id.
76. See Suein L. Hwang & Ann Davis, Secondhand-Smoke Case May Kindle New Suits, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 13, 1997, at B1. The settlement itself was upheld by the state court of appeals. Ra-
mos v. Philip Morris Cos., 1999 Fla. App. LEXIS 3422 (Mar. 24, 1999).
77. See, e.g., Dunn v. RJR Nabisco Holdings Corp., 18D01-9305-CT-06 (Cir. Ct., Delaware
Co., Ind.) (a secondhand smoke suit brought by a nurse at a VA hospital in Indiana whose claim
was dismissed on causation grounds). See Top 1998 Defense Wins: Hazy Case for Nonsmokers'
Wrongful-Death Suit, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 19, 1999, at A14.
78. Similarly, in the handgun context, supplier responsibility for enabling behavior is not nec-
essarily limited to criminal intervention. Handguns are highly dangerous even in the hands of
some "innocent" intervening third parties, such as a child who gets hold of his parents' weapon
and in the course of play seriously, but unwittingly, injures a playmate.
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sponsibility arising in the course of ordinary commercial activity, they
are still grounded in the familiar: a two-party litigation setting in
which harm is clearly traceable from an identifiable defendant to a
particular plaintiff. This traditional requirement of a causal nexus has
been relaxed in some instances in recent mass tort litigation, and, by
extension, it is also a feature of the ongoing enabling claims against
tobacco and handgun manufacturers.
Like the enabling concept itself, the extension of this relaxed ver-
sion of wrongdoer identification is based on practical considerations.
Not only has the immediate harm been committed by an elusive, often
unidentifiable intervenor, but the risk-initiator itself is an enterprise
whose product-be it a particular brand of cigarettes or make of
handguns-contributes in a collective, nonsegregable way to the over-
all harm done by tobacco or handguns generically. Or, at least, so
goes the argument: traditional case-by-case identification is simply too
complex a proposition to be workable.
The paradigm product is DES, a miscarriage preventive that came
to be closely identified with cases of cervical cancer in the daughters
of women who ingested the product during pregnancy, a generation
earlier. The long passage of time, as well as the circumstances under
which the product was sold-generally from undifferentiated batches
distributed by a large number of drug companies-led to a situation in
which most of the victims could not identify the manufacturer whose
product had in fact caused their harm. Beginning with the landmark
California case of Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,79 many state courts
adopted a version of market share liability, in which the plaintiffs only
were required to establish that a substantial share of the market for a
"fungible" defective product was represented by the defendants in the
case.80 Identification of the particular defendant whose DES was in-
gested in utero by the plaintiff was not essential. Indeed, the New
York Court of Appeals, in a dramatic move, held that even if a de-
fendant could establish that its pill was not the source of a particular
plaintiff's harm-a handful of manufacturers distributed identifiable
pills or through identifiable retailers-it nonetheless could be held ac-
countable for its proportional share of the harm.81
Market share liability has been criticized as judicial overreaching,
tantamount to setting up a social welfare scheme for compensating
79. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
80. See David M. Schultz, Market Share Liability in DES Cases: The Unwarranted Erosion of
Causation in Fact, 40 DEPAUL L. RaV. 771, 782-85 (1991).
81. Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989).
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injury victims. 82 And the courts have demonstrated sensitivity to
these protestations by carefully limiting the principle to "fungible"
products, for the most part.8 3 But the pragmatic impulses underlying
enabling liability open the door for creative extensions into this realm.
The wide variety of tobacco brands are essentially similar in their
potential for causing secondhand smoke-related harm (handgun "fun-
gibility" may be a somewhat more debatable proposition). The cloak
of anonymity covering the sources of immediate harm (legions of
unidentifiable smokers and armed assailants, respectively) roughly
parallels the vagaries of DES distribution and purchase. And to the
extent that market share liability rests on an equitable notion of fair-
ness in allocating responsibility, and/or an efficiency rationale of creat-
ing appropriate incentives for safety, advocates of enabling-based
industry liability arguably make out as strong a case as the claimants
whose theories were persuasive to the Sindell court and its followers.
Indeed, from the perspective of incentives to safety, DES was long-
removed from the market when Sindell and its progeny were decided,
whereas tobacco and handguns enjoy widespread continuing use, de-
spite their associated toll of death and serious injury. And from a
fairness perspective, DES victims seem neither more nor less "deserv-
ing" than the victims of secondhand smoke and handgun injuries.
Perhaps, then, this newest phase in the saga of enabling liability
may have more staying power than its opponents anticipate.
Whatever the case, the judiciary has turned out to be far more ven-
turesome in articulating variations on the enabling theme than Oliver
Wendell Holmes anticipated in his early speculation on the contours
of liability for harm caused by third party intervenors. 84
IV. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
But how far can one extend this latest turn in liability for enabling
conduct-this notion of collective industry responsibility for market-
ing products "inviting" misuse and consequent harm to innocent vic-
tims? Do the manufacturers of alcoholic beverages bear enabling
responsibility for the many thousands of annual drunk driving deaths
and serious injuries? Do the manufacturers of baseball bats "enable"
their use as a club to beat innocent victims senseless?
82. See William J. Warfel, Adoption of the Market Share Approach in Long-Tail Product Lia-
bility Litigation-The Transformation of the Tort System into a Compensation System, 17 OHIo
N.U. L. REV. 785, 803-04 (1991).
83. See Andrew B. Nace, Note, Market Share Liability: A Current Assessment of a Decade-Old
Doctrine, 44 VAND. L. REV. 395, 414-20 (1991).
84. See Holmes, supra note 14, at 10-11.
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It is possible to stop short of handgun liability, of course, and avoid
opening this can of worms. On the other hand, it may also be possible
to stop at handgun liability, drawing distinctions from these possible
further extensions of the enabling notion. Handguns are, after all,
designed for a dangerous purpose-that is why even "innocent users"
are obligated, both by humanitarian and legal concerns, to keep them
well concealed so that they do not fall into the hands of another party,
however innocent the third-party's designs. Baseball bats and alcohol,
on the other hand, do not pose risks to the public when properly used.
If this distinction seems attenuated when applied to alcohol, consider
our ordinary language usage: one "uses" a handgun in harming an in-
nocent victim; one "abuses" alcohol in doing so. These distinctions
perhaps carry us to the far reaches of enabling responsibility. Or per-
haps not. Looking back to the early 1900s one would have been hard
put to predict where our social mores and ethical dictates would take
us in creating legal obligations to protect against injuries from unre-
lated third parties. Looking ahead to a new century, prognostication
is equally hazardous.
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